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DENIAL OF DEFICIENCY: A PROBLEM OF REASONABLE NOTICE
UNDER UCC § 9-504(3)
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code' details a comprehensive
scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and
fixtures.2 More particularly, Part 5 of Article 9 deals with the relative
position of parties with respect to collateral after default by the debtor.
Upon default a secured party has the right to take possession of the collat-
eral.8 Once the secured party has repossessed the collateral, he may "sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then condi-
tion or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing"4
after giving reasonable notice to the debtor and to any other person who
has a filed or known security interest.' Indeed, the secured party must
make an effective disposition of the collateral before he may recover any
part of the unpaid purchase price from the borrower. 6 Section 9-504(3)
details the requirements to be followed in most cases for providing notice
of the sale or other disposition. The UCC requires only that "reasonable
notice" be sent and that persons entitled to -receive notice have time to
protect their interests. Three exceptions to the notice requirement are pro-
vided in § 9-504(3). If the collateral is perishable, threatens to decline
speedily in value, or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market,
notice is not required.7 When the procedures outlined in § 9-504(3) are
1 Hereinafter referred to as UCC or Code. All citations to UCC or Code, unless otherwise
indicated, will be made to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 Official Text with Comments
published by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
2See UCC § 9-101, Comment.
3 UCC § 9-503. But cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
4 UCC § 9-504(1).
r UCC § 9-504(3). The section provides in part:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place
of the public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has a secur-
ity interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in
the name of the debtor in this state or who is known by the secured party to have
a security interest in the collateral.
A small minority of states deny deficiencies to secured parties who fail to comply with the no-
tice requirements. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1319.07 (Page 1962).
6 Compulsory disposition of consumer goods is required where the debtor has paid 60%
of the cash price. See UCC § 9-505(1). Not every "transfer" is a "disposition," however.
See UCC § 9-504(5); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Beckwith, 23 Conn. Supp. 362, 183
A.2d 755 (1962).
7 The recognized market exception, in particular, has been narrowly construed. This narrow
reading is justified in light of the great leeway given to the secured party who sells the
collateral within this exception. Notice is excused, § 9-504(3); the secured party can buy
at a private disposition, § 9-504(3); and resale is considered to be made in a commercially
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not followed, the secured party may incur liability for noncompliance un-
der § 9-507(1) and may possibly lose his right to recover any remaining
deficiency from the debtor.
This note will consider the denial of deficiency as a remedial device
for failure to give reasonable notice. It is concluded that a secured party
should not be free to sell or otherwise dispose of collateral, except after
full compliance with the § 9-504(3) notice requirement; that the statutory
remedies for noncompliance are, for the most part, inadequate; and that,
upon failure to comply with the statutory requirements, the denial of defi-
ciency is the most effective means to prevent abuse of the notice provisions
by the secured party.
II. DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO GIVE REASONABLE NOTICE
Two statutory remedies are potentially applicable when collateral has
been sold without adequate notice. First, there is a general damage rem-
edy which is provided by statute to the debtor and any secured party who
was entitled to notice. Second, there is a minimum statutory penalty
available to the debtor whose consumer-goods collateral was sold without
proper notice.
A. Statutory Damages
When a secured party fails to comply with the notice requirement,
§ 9-507(1) permits the "debtor or any person entitled to notification...
to recover from the secured party any loss"" caused thereby. Since a pur-
chaser after default acquires the collateral free of the debtor's interest,
the secured party's interest, and all subordinate interests, provided he has
not acted in bad faith,9 this protection is necessary.
The UCC's use of such broad language unfortunately sheds little light
on how this provision is to be applied. One commentator has asserted
that a strict contractual approach is required.'" Thus the usual measure
of damages would be the difference between the sale price of the collateral
and the price for which it would have been sold had notice been given.
Presumably this is the market value at the time of the wrongful disposition.
This measure of damages ostensibly places the injured party in the same
position he would have been in had the notice requirement been fully
performed. But the UCC mandates that the remedies incorporated in the
reasonable manner, § 9-507(2). Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under
the UCC, 47 MINN. L. REV. 205, 222 n.89 (1962); see generally, I P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN
& D. VAGTs, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8.04(2) (d)
(i), at 893 (1972).
8 Emphasis supplied.
9UCC § 9-504(4).
10 Comment, The Damage Award for Improper Disposition of Collateral Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 49 ORE. L. REv. 65, 74 (1969).
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Code be liberally administered." Although in the ordinary case the actual
"loss" ought to be reflected by compensatory damages,'12 if those damages
prove inadequate courts should be free to fashion a remedy which they
deem appropriate."3 Compensatory damages might prove inadequate when
the collateral is such that it is subject to price fluctuations within a rela-
tively short period of time and the market value at the time of disposition
reflects the value at one of the low points during such a fluctuation.
In addition, punitive damages ought to be available to the debtor when
the facts surrounding the failure to give notice indicate malicious intent.
No reported cases, however, have considered punitive damages in conjunc-
tion with the narrow issue of proper notice. The lack of precedent indi-
cates the limited availability of punitive damages as a remedy or effective
deterrent. One possible case in point, however, is Skeels v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp.'4 This decision underscores the difficulty involved in
proving malicious intent as well as the problem of demonstrating a causal
connection between the intent and the act involved.' 5 These difficulties
multiply when an attempt is made to prove sufficient malicious intent to
justify an award of punitive damages based upon factual situations which
involve only lack of proper notice and no affirmative act. This discussion
is not intended to suggest that punitive damages are not available under
§ 9-507(1), but only that, because of evidentiary problems, it is unlikely
such damages will ever be awarded solely for failure to send adequate
notice. Thus, although theoretically justified, punitive damages will prove
to be of negligible value to debtors, and will provide only a slight deterrent
effect.
B. Minimum Recovery-Consumer Goods
Disposal of "consumer goods" without notice to the debtor permits
additional recovery under § 9-507(1). The debtor 6 may recover an
amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten percent of the
principal amount of the debt, or the time price differential plus ten percent
of the cash price. 7  The adoption of the UCC brought with it this con-
"1UCC § 1-102(1).
12 E.g., Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
13 One suggestion is to employ the damage remedy used for cases of conversion, the highest
intermediate value within a reasonable time after repossession. II G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.2, at 1257 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as
GILMORE]; cf. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.38, at 192-97 (1956).
14222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3rd
Cir. 1964).
15Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1964).
'
6 UCC § 9-504(3). Notice need only be sent to the debtor when there is a sale or
other disposition of consumer goods.
17 Special protection without proof of loss is not novel to the Code, nor were such protections
limited to consumer sales in prior acts. The UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 25
[hereinafter referred to as USCA] allowed the buyer to recover "from the seller his actual
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sumer-nonconsumer distinction which is based on the theory that the con-
sumer debtor is a non-professional and is therefore less able to protect
his interests when dealing with a professional. 8 The inclusion of this
remedy provided not only an alternative method of compensatory recovery,
but also a method of awarding punitive damages. 19 Consumer transac-
tions are not likely to involve actual damages, but even when they do the
amounts recoverable are likely to be consumed by the excessive costs of
proving such damages. Thus the potential for abuse of the default pro-
visions was the underlying reason for the adoption of a statutory penalty.
The penalty serves as a protective device in many situations in which the
consumer would otherwise be left without an adequate remedy. However,
the statutory minimum recovery is efficacious only if repossession takes
place before the debt has been substantially repaid.2°
The UCC does not explicitly indicate when the statutory penalty should
be available. Should it be awarded only when actual damages are ascer-
tainable, and only if they are less than the statutory penalty? Section
9-507(1) permits the consumer to recover "in any event an amount not
less than" the statutory penalty. A comment to that section further indi-
cates that this provision "states a minimum recovery" in transactions in-
volving consumer goods. The UCC thus dictates that the consumer rem-
edy should be an alternative measure of damages when actual damages
are less than the consumer penalty or are nonexistent.2'
III. DENIAL OF THE DEFICIENCY
After proper sale or disposition of repossessed collateral, the secured
party must remit to the debtor any surplus. The secured party may also
look to the debtor for any deficiency if the net proceeds of the sale do
not equal or exceed the amount of debt and expenses (unless otherwise
agreed by the parties)." The decided cases, however, are split as to
whether the secured party may recover a deficiency if he resells but fails
to notify the debtor of the resale as required by § 9-504(3).
Many courts deciding this issue have permitted the secured party to
damages, if any, and in no event less than one-fourth of the sum of all payments which
have been made under the contract, with interest." This penalty had limited effectiveness.
See 2A UNIFORM LAWS, ANNOTATED § 129, at 181 (1924).
18TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ANALYSES OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 130
(1955).
19 See In re Frye, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 913, 920 (U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D. Ohio 1970).
20 "If repossession took place before much had been paid, the recovery of 10 per cent
plus financing charges could prefectly well exceed the payments. In such a case, at least,
the Code provision would amount to a real penalty .. " GILMORE, supra note 13, at 1260.
21 Cf. Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 83 N.M. 77, 79, 488 P.2d 127, 129 (1971).
2 2 UCC §§ 9-504(2); 9-50 4 (1)(a). Unless the transaction was a sale of accounts, contract
rights or chattel paper. UCC § 9-504(2).
[Vol. 34
recover the deficiency.23 Although the debtor ordinarily has the burden
of proving damages, these courts condition the recovery of the deficiency,
notwithstanding the secured party's failure to give proper notice, on his
proving that the "reasonable value" of the collateral is credited to the
debtor's account. If the secured party fails to meet this burden of proof,
the courts presume that the value of the collateral was at least the amount
of the debt.24  Shifting the burden of proof as to reasonable value, the
courts reason, will adequately prevent creditors from deriving advantage
from their own misconduct. 25
Other courts deciding this issue have denied recovery of any deficiency
in all cases in which the statutory notice requirement has not been met.26
These courts have reached such a conclusion irrespective of the amount
of the deficiency or the commercial reasonableness of the resale. It is
submitted that this approach achieves a more efficacious result.
Denial of the deficiency, as a penalty for failure to give proper notice
of resale or other disposition, has both positive and negative implications.
On the positive side, it maintains a more favorable balance of rights in
the collateral after default, a balance which is neglected by the default
provisions and scarcely recognized in the comments to those provisions.
Although Part 5 of Article 9 purports to protect both debtor and creditor
rights after default,27 the balance weighs heavily against the debtor. A
fundamental example is the UCC's treatment of what constitutes a "de-
fault." The drafters intentionally omitted any definition of default, thus
leaving the matter up to the parties. This omission has led to inclusion
of sweeping contractual terms, such as "any feeling of insecurity," 2 which
are unfair to debtors. Although not every debtor is in such a weak bar-
gaining position that he must yield to the imposition of such terms, in
many cases the debtor must either accept the terms or look elsewhere for
credit. Furthermore, the ease with which the secured party can repossess
and resell or otherwise dispose of the collateral tends to create deficien-
29cies, particularly since the secured party need not sell at the best possible
price."0 A less favorable implication is that denial of any deficiency for
failure to give reasonable notice may tend to prolong litigation. Strict
23E.g., Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
24 See Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 149-50, 398 S.W.2d 538,
542 (1966); Leasing Assoc., Inc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174, 177 (8th Cir.
1971).
2 5Id,
26 E.g., Leasco Data Proces. Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1098, 323 N.Y.S.2d
13 (1971).
2 7 See UCC § 9-501, Comment 1.
2 8 See Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld
and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REv. 302, 308 (1972).
29 Compare UCC § 9-503 with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
30UCC § 9-508(2). Additionally the secured party can recover certain expenses. UCC
§ 9-504(1),
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construction of the notice requirement will encourage debtors' attorneys
to complicate litigation with defenses of technical breaches.", A broader
construction of the notice requirement, however, will mitigate these ef-
fects.82
On the negative side, denial of any deficiency may give a "windfall"
to the debtor. The deficiency might be considered a windfall if there
are no statutory damages or if the debtor recovers the consumer-debtor
damages. But regardless of its characterization as a windfall, courts should
continue to deny recovery of any deficiency when the secured party fails
to comply with the notice provision. Denial of the deficiency is a measure
of punitive damages, necessary because of the failure to provide any sub-
stantial protection for the debtor in the default provisions of the UCC.
The rights of the debtor in the collateral after default are interests which
warrant protection. The UCC's damage provision, § 9-507 (1), does not
adequately protect the debtor's interest; thus, denial of the deficiency is
the most effective means to assure compliance with the notice provision.
However, courts will not find support for their decisions in any specific
language in the UCC or its comments regarding the availability of a defi-
ciency when a secured party has failed to comply with the notice provi-
sion.as Consequently, some courts have turned to pre-Code law as author-
ity to deny recovery of any deficiency, 4 while others have bypassed pre-
Code precedent in the course of permitting complete recovery.35 Since
the UCC is silent with respect to the availability of deficiencies when the
notice requirement has not been met, the argument can be made that the
Code implicitly adopted the practices prevalent under prior statutes.36
81 Cf. Clark, supra note 30, at 321.
32 An approach such as that taken in Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57
Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966), is preferable. In Mallicoat, the secured party
attempted to send notice by registered mail, ordinarily an acceptable method. This attempt,
however, was held unreasonable under the circumstances because the secured party was aware
that the debtor had not received the notice. In spite of this, the secured party made no
further attempt to notify the debtor, although he possessed additional information as to where
the debtor was employed and where the debtor's parents lived. The court emphasized the
effect which that failure had upon the rights of the debtor in the collateral. Id. at 113-
14, 415 S.W.2d at 350. But see White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repos-
sessions, Resales and Deficienacy Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 808 (1970), where
the author contends that "[nlothing in the Code mentions an additional requirement of a
second contact when the creditor learns that the first has failed, but debtors' lawyers will
wish to build upon the judicial gloss which Mallicoat has deposited on section 9-504." Id.
at 820.
33 GILMORE, supra note 12, § 44.9.4, at 1264.
34 E.g., Leasco Data Process. Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d
13 (1971).
35 .g., Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971),
affd -uenz., 118 N.J. Super. 521, 288 A.2d 872 (1972); noted in 76 DIcK. L REV. 394
(1971).
36 The decisions which have rejected pre-Code precedent do not provide sufficient analysis
of this argument. E.g., Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 176 A.2d
402 (1971).
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Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act37 some courts asserted that,
since the right to bring suit for a deficiency was created by statute, com-
pliance with the provisions of the statute was a prerequisite to the main-
tenance of a suit for any deficiencyY8 Thus most UCSA courts held that
adequate notice, i.e., literal compliance with the notice provision, was a
condition precedent to recovery of any deficiency. An argument advanced
by one commentator 0 against applying the "condition precedent" rationale
of pre-Code cases to transactions under the UCC is that this rule was more
appropriate to suits brought under the UCSA than the UCC. The UCC
only requires "reasonable notice" while the UCSA precisely described the
manner of the notice. Thus, he asserts "[i]t would appear that the flexi-
bility of the notice provisions under the Code leaves too much room for
honest error ... ."I' The difficulty with this argument is revealed by
a comparison of the notice provisions of the two statutes. It is more rea-
sonble to deny recovery of a deficiency under the UCC than under the
UCSA, in light of the less restrictive requirements for notice in the UCC;
the chances of a technical breach resulting in a failure to meet the notice
requirement, as often occurred under the UCSA, are greatly diminished
by the "reasonable notice" requirement of the UCC.
Analogizing to the pre-Code case law does, however, have weaknesses.
Since the UCC has altered so much of the prior law, the premise that
the drafters' failure to comment on pre-Code practices indicates tacit accep-
tance of those practices is not necessarily valid. Thus the UCC itself must
be looked to as authority. Courts need not rely on pre-Code cases, as
some have, to deny recovery of a deficiency, since the UCC and its com-
ments can be interpreted as supporting the conclusion that denial of any
deficiency is an appropriate remedy available to the debtor, in addition
to the remedies provided in § 9-507(1), when the secured party fails to
give notice of the sale under § 9-504(3).
Courts have touched on ideas which are basic to including the denial
of deficiency among the debtor's remedies. According to one theory, de-
nial of recovery of any deficiency is proper since failure to give notice
impairs the right to redeem the collateral.42  The second theory is that
denial is proper for the reason that § 9-504(3) was passed to protect the
interest of the debtor in the collateral, and failure to give notice destroys
the ability to protect that interest.43
37 UCSA §§ 19-22.38 Bergen Auto Co. v. Mattarochio, 58 N.J. Super. 161, 165, 155 A.2d 787, 789 (1959).See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski, 195 A.2d 546 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963).
39Note, 5 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 831, 835 (1964).
401d. at 836.
41 See I GILMoRE, supra note 13, § 44.9A, at 1264.
42 Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 701, 161 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1968).43 See One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 792 (Mass. App.Div. 1968).
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Under the UCC collateral may be redeemed by tendering payment
of all obligations as well as expenses incurred by the secured party.44 In-
deed, even if part of the collateral has been sold or contracted to be sold,
the debtor may redeem the remainder.4 5  Thus the debtor has the oppor-
tunity to protect his equity in the collateral. Failure to notify the debtor
of resale impairs the right of redemption since good faith purchasers take
free of the debtor's interest in the collateral in spite of defects in the
sale.46 In addition, resale generates expenses for preparation of the collat-
eral and legal fees, both of which increase the amount of the deficiency. Thus
the right of redemption is essential to the debtor in order to enable him
to retain his interest in the collateral as well as to minimize the expenses
after default. Some commentators question the efficacy of the redemption
right, suggesting that it is more important in theory than in practice be-
cause it is seldom exercised.4 7  The challenge is appropriate in many in-
stances since debtors often will not have the funds or immediate financing
necessary to the exercise of the right. The inability to redeem will occur
primarily in consumer transactions. In such transactions resale value is
not great; it is likely that the secured party will include an acceleration
clause in the security agreement, thereby making it extremely difficult to
redeem.
48
The vast area of non-consumer transactions, however, does involve
many different situations and circumstances in which redemption can prove
useful. These include transactions secured with many items of collateral
worth more than the debt and collateral which has a tendency to appre-
ciate in value. A hypothetical set of facts will illustrate this point:49 A
debtor purchases restaurant equipment for $33,000, approximately one
half of which is evidenced by a note and a security interest in the equip-
ment. The debtor later defaults on the note and the secured party repos-
sesses the collateral. Subsequently, the secured party purchases the collat-
eral at an otherwise proper public sale without having sent notice of the
sale to the debtor. After expenses and legal fees are deducted, there re-
mains a deficiency of $2,000. Less than a year later the same equipment
is resold to the debtor for $22,000. Assuming all other aspects of the
resale were commercially reasonable, this hypothetical suggests that the
44UCC § 9-506.
45UCC § 9-506, Comment.
46UCC § 9-504(4).
47 GILMORE, supra note 13, § 44.2, at 1216; White, Representing the Low Income Con-
sumer i'n Repossessions, Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 808, 821
n.40 (1970).
48"[I]f the agreement contains a clause accelerating the entire balance due on default
in one installment, the entire balance would have to be tendered." UCC § 9-506, Comment.
Courts may find the acceleration clauses unconscionable, however, and not enforce them. Robin-
son v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 15, 16 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1967).
49 The facts for the hypothetical were suggested by those in Crest Investment Trust, Inc.
v. Alatzas, 264 Md. 571, 287 A.2d 261 (1972).
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right to redeem has more than just a theoretical justification. The debtor's
right to redeem the collateral was valuable to him because the value of the
collateral was substantially more than the amount of the debt. The debtor
could redeem the collateral himself. Once refinanced, the debtor can min-
imize his losses by either resuming his operation or selling the collateral
to realize his equity.
Closely related to this discussion is the fact that not every debtor who
will be liable for a deficiency owns the collateral which secures his debt.
Thus the intervention of a third party who is also a debtor for purposes
of notice increases the likelihood of redemption. The third party may
be in a better position to secure financing or pay cash than the person
liable for the deficiency. Moreover, the expenses incurred during resale
would be substantially decreased by early redemption. Indeed, barring
the deficiency judgment will encourage more efficient dispositions of the
collateral. The secured party who has not met the notice requirement
will be less willing to increase his out-of-pocket expenses incident to the
disposition of the collateral when he knows that failure to meet the notice
requirement may result in his inability to recapture those expenses.
The second theory, that the notice provision was adopted with the
intent of protecting the interests of the debtor in the collateral, is supported
by the following rationale: (1) notice of a public sale gives the debtor
an opportunity to bid himself or to secure the attendance of other bidders
at the sale, and (2) attendance of the debtor militates against collusive
practices or defects in the sale which affect its commercial reasonableness.
The effect, then, is to give the debtor a means of protecting his interest
in the collateral.
Additionally, the possibility exists that the secured party will attempt
to unload the collateral while the market is low. In many situations the
sale would meet Code standards of commercial reasonableness, but would
result in an increased deficiency since the Code does not require that the
secured party, obtain the best price.50 The drafters recognized that this
problem could be especially troublesome in sales of accounts, contract
rights and chattel paper. "1 In those transactions the debtor is not liable
for any deficiency unless so provided in the agreement.5 2 Apparently the
risks inherent in transactions which involve intangibles were thought to
be so one-sided that the drafters felt impelled to even the balance by stat-
ute.5 3  Conversely, the risks inherent in other transactions would remain
in parity, thus giving a partial rationale for different treatment by the
UCC. We must assume, however, that the drafters presupposed that this
parity would be maintained; the other sections of Part 5 would prevent
50 See UCC § 9-507(2).
51See UCC § 9-502, Comment 2.
52UCC § 9-504(2).
53 See UCC § 9-502, Comment 2.
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risk-shifting. They do not. Although the drafters created an exception
for sales of certain intangibles, availability of the deficiency was not made
absolute in other transactions. To the extent that a secured party may
act without regard for the debtor's right to notice, yet still act within the
bounds of commercial reasonableness, the denial of the deficiency serves
as the only effective check on the indiscriminate exercise of the secured
party's rights. A look at a recent case, however, discloses that some courts
have not recognized this problem.
In Conti Causeway Ford v. larossy,54 a case that involved consumer
goods, the court based its decision to allow recovery of a deficiency on
a determination of the commercial reasonableness of the resale. The court
said:
It therefore must be decided whether the sale was so commercially unrea-
sonable as to bar recovery of the deficiency.
[W]here reasonable notice of sale has not been given, the spirit of
commercial reasonableness requires that the secured party not be arbitrarily
deprived of his deficiency .... 55
The court seemed to acknowledge the punitive nature of the denial of
deficiency, but its decision turned on the commercial reasonableness of the
resale. This result is an unnecessary blend of two different concepts.
Although related to the notice requirement, the inclusion of a commer-
cial reasonableness requirement in § 9-504(3) is principally to protect in-
terests different from those which the notice requirement protects. The
statute itself states that "every aspect of the disposition including the meth-
od, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable .... "
This indicates that the purpose of commercial reasonableness is to set stan-
dards of propriety at the time of disposition of the collateral. Notice, on the
other hand, was included to insure that the debtor (and other secured par-
ties) could protect his interest in the collateral itself after default and be-
fore disposition.56 Notwithstanding these differences, Conti neglected this
distinction when it suggested that the proper test of the secured party's
right to recover a deficiency was whether the reasonable value of the collat-
eral was credited to the debtor's account.57 The damage award in Conti
indicates how the "commercially reasonable" test undercuts the intended
effect of the statute. The secured party had disposed of the collateral
in a commercially reasonable manner and the failure to give notice caused
no injury to the debtor so there was no claim for actual damages under
§ 9-507(1). But the debtor was a consumer, which entitled him to re-
54 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971).
55 Id. at 385-86, 276 A.2d at 404.
56 See UCC § 9-504, Comment 5.
57 Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 386, 276 A.2d 402, 404-05
(1971).
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cover the statutory penalty. The court then offset that penalty ($872.00)
by the amount of the deficiency ($258.12) and awarded a judgment for
the difference ($613.88) to the debtor. This result at first seems equitable.
But if the debtor were not a consumer, he would be liable for the de-
ficiency despite the secured party's failure to give notice, because the sale
was commercially reasonable and caused no other damages. Such a result
seems inescapable unless the court meant to suggest a "line-drawing" test.
It is unlikely that the court had this in mind, however, since use of a
line-drawing approach would depend upon making artificial distinctions
within the same transaction. The decision indicates that a secured party
could recover the deficiency if a "reasonable amount" is credited to the
debtor's account. But the best possible price is not required to meet the
Jests of commercial reasonableness under § 9-507(2). Thus in order to
maintain the integrity of the requirement of notice and the requirement
of commercial reaspaableness as two different, although related, concepts,
a factual distinction would have to be drawn. The distinction would be
made between the amount realized at resale adequate to meet the UCC
requirements of commercial reasonableness and an amount realized at re-
sale sufficient to be the reasonable amount necessary to enable the secured
party to recover any deficiency. If no distinction is drawn, the notice pro-
vision otherwise becomes dependent upon, rather than exclusive of, the
commercial reasonableness requirement. Perhaps the court's reluctance to
deny the deficiency was in part based on the fact that the debtor recovered
the statutory penalty, but the decision indicates that the court would have
ignored this distinction also. The opinion cites Norton v. National Bank
of Commerce"' as authority which indicates that the same conclusion would
have been reached if consumer goods were not involved. Thus the notice
requirement is rendered meaningless in situations in which the debtor suf-
fers no actual damage and the disposition was carried out in a commercially
reasonable manner.
Left only with the syntax of § 9-504(3), one might well conclude
that the drafters did not intend to blur the distinction between the tests
of reasonable notice and commercial reasonableness. Indeed, it is difficult
to impute to the drafters an intention that failure to comply with certain
requirements would go unpunished. By making the notice requirement
non-waivable"9 the drafters have implicitly indicated that this requirement
5 8 Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W:2d 58 (1966). In Nor-
ton, the court did not expressly characterize the goods. The issue was raised because counsel
assumed the goods were consumer goods, but since the court found that Norton was a debtor
it did not feel compelled to decide the issue. When the court considered the damages, however,
it made no mention of the statutory penalty, which leads to the conclusion that the court
would not have considered the collateral involved to be consumer goods for the purpose
of awarding damages. Id. at 149, 398 S.W.2d at 541.
59 See UCC § 9-501(3)(b). In 1972 the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC adopted
amendments to Article 9. The amendments, if adopted, will permit the debtor to remove
or modify his right to notification after default. UCC § 9-504(3) (1972 version).
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is not one to be taken lightly. Thus when a secured party sells or disposes
of the collateral on his own behalf, he should be required to act in a
manner which is to the debtor's benefit as well as his own. 0 The secured
party should not be afforded the opportunity to realize all his rights in
the collateral at the expense of the debtor's rights. The secured parties
who commit these breaches do not do so under impulse or chance. They
have ample opportunity to weigh the risks involved against advantages
and calculate their courses of action.
By permitting recovery of deficiencies when there has been a breach
of the duty to give notice of resale, the courts have given a great deal
of discretion to the secured party, subject only to the remedies contained
in § 9-507(1). The natural outgrowth of cases such as Conti, in which
the secured party may recover a deficiency, is a continued abuse of the
debtor's right to notice since withdrawal of the penalty leaves no incentive
to comply with the notice requirement if the secured party acts in a com-
mercially reasonable manner.
In addition, the denial of deficiency is available as an affirmative de-
fense in a claim for a deficiency by a secured party. Thus the pervasive-
ness of the penalty is likely to give it a greater deterrent effect. Although
it is difficult to assess its effectiveness until the Code is amended to provide
more realistic remedies for abuse, the denial of any deficiency for failure
to give notice appears to be the only remedy that will adequately deter im-
proper conduct by secured parties.
Two interpretive problems remain. Should the deficiency be denied
only in consumer transactions, only in nonconsumer transactions, or in
both? Should it be denied if the debtor suffers provable actual damages
or if the debtor recovers the statutory penalty? Denial of the deficiency
is a means of awarding punitive damages. It serves the salutary purpose
of deterring creditors from abuse of this preferred position at the expense
of the debtor's interest. It also enables the debtor to recover, albeit in-
directly, many of his intangible losses to the extent of the deficiency, such
as his loss of equity and litigation expenses which ordinarily are not re-
coverable as compensatory damages. Therefore, it is submitted that the
deficiency be denied in all cases where the secured party fails to send notice,
in addition to any award of compensatory damages.
III. CONCLUSION
The notice provision can only be as effective as the means by which
it is enforced. The statutory scheme creates liability for failure to give
reasonable notice. In transactions involving nonconsumer goods it allows
recovery of losses, which should include compensatory damages as well
as punitive damages. In transactions involving consumer goods an alterna-
60 Cf. UCC § 2-706; UCC § 2-706, Comment 2.
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tive remedy is provided which permits a specified minimum recovery with-
out proof of loss. These remedies, however, have proved inadequate.
Thus some jurisdictions impose a non-Code penalty by denying recovery
of any deficiency if the notice requirement is not met.
The secured transaction places the secured party in a preferred position
compared to unsecured lenders since he can repossess the collateral and
resell it to pay the debt owed him without court intervention. In doing
so, however, the UCC has attempted to protect the debtor from dealings
inimical to his interests. Since the UCC has minimized the formal re-
quirements of the disposition it should be incumbent upon the secured
party to comply with § 9-504(1) which is aimed at protecting these in-
terests. To this end, denial of the deficiency serves as the most effective
means of policing this provision. Because it is a punitive measure it has
a deterrent effect upon secured parties who recklessly disregard the rights
of debtors in the repossessed collateral. Therefore recovery of any defi-
ciency should be denied in all cases where the secured party fails to send
reasonable notice of resale or other disposition.
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